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INTRODUCTION
The trial judge had a duty to instruct the jury on the lesser-related offense of
receiving stolen property. The evidence supported that John was home at the time of the
burglary and that he took possession of the VCR and portable stereo under suspicious
circumstances. The only outstanding issue for this Court is whether the trial judge
abused his discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense theory because the
judge concluded that defense counsel untimely requested the jury instruction. The record
indicates that the request may have been timely, defense counsel acted in good faith, and
neither the State nor the trial judge were prejudiced by the request. In fact, as recent
amendments to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19 show, defense counsel's request at
the close of the evidence was entirely appropriate. Further, even if defense counsel's
proffered instruction incorrectly stated the law, the trial judge had a duty to instruct the
jury on the applicable defense theory of receiving stolen property.

I.

BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE
DEFENSE THEORY THAT APPELLANT LIKELY
KNEW THE PROPERTY WAS STOLEN, THE TRIAL
JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY ON THE LESSER RELATED OFFENSE OF
POSSESSING STOLEN PROPERTY

The trial testimony rationally supported the defense theory that John knowingly
possessed stolen property. Contrary to the State's claims, John never denied knowing
that the VCR and portable stereo were stolen. To the contrary, the defense case appeared
to be geared toward allowing the jury to infer that very fact. Because the evidence was
consistent with the defense theory, the law on lesser related offenses required the trial
judge to instruct the jury on the crime of receiving stolen property.
Without conceding the issue, the State does not contest that receiving stolen
property was a lesser-related offense to burglary in this case. State's Brief at 28. Instead,
the State asserts that the trial judge properly refused to instruct the jury on that defense
theory because John "denied complicity" in both the burglary charge and the receiving
offense. kL The record contains no such denials. Even the State's own citations to the
trial transcript show that John offered no specific testimony about his knowledge when
he accepted the stolen equipment from Cherie, April, and David. State's Brief at 29
(citing to R. 249: 79, 81-82). Although John admitted that when the police approached
him he knew that the electronic equipment was stolen, he never addressed his
understanding when he took the property.
Rather, the entire defense strategy appears to have been to allow the jury decide
2

for itself whether John was an innocent victim or that he believed that his three friends
had stolen the VCR and portable stereo. The law on lesser-related offenses only required
John to show that "the evidence provides a 'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting'" on the lesser offense. State v. Hansen ,
734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Baker . 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)
(internal quotation omitted)). Here, the defense presented evidence that John was home
at the time of the burglary, accepted the electronic equipment from persons who had
recently stolen it, made no arrangements to return the items, and accepted the portable
stereo even though it needed no repair. Then, John hid the items after receiving them
from his friends.
This evidence more than adequately supports the rational inference that John
committed the crime of receiving stolen property. Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424. For
purposes of this case, John committed a crime if he possessed the property "knowing"
that it was stolen or "believing that it probably ha[d] been stolen." Utah Code Ann. § 766-408( 1) (1999). * Utah law allows the trier of fact to presume a person possesses stolen

'That statute provides in its entirety:
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of
the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or
believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals,
sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding
the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
intending to deprive the owner of it.

3

property when, as here, the property has been recently stolen and "no satisfactory
explanation of such possession is made...." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1999).
The suspicious circumstances under which John accepted the stolen property established
a reasonable belief that the property was stolen and, given the presumption above, may
have even supported actual knowledge that Cherie, April, and David had taken the
property and wanted John to store it for them. The "jury was not so limited in its
permissible assessment of the evidence" to exclude the possibility that John knew or
believed the property was stolen. State v. Jones, 878 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (evidence consistent with defendant's testimony that he touched victim but did so
without intent to inflict pain or gratify sexual desires). Because the evidence was
"[consistent" with this defense theory, the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury
on receiving stolen property. Hansen, 734 P.2d at 423.

(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is
presumed in the case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on
a separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding
the receiving offense charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or
disposed, acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far
below its reasonable value[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999).
4

II.

BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL ACTED IN GOOD
FAITH AND THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE
LESSER-RELATED OFFENSE, THE TRIAL JUDGE
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER OFFENSE

Since the evidence supported the crime of receiving stolen property, the only
remaining question for this Court addresses the trial judge's decision to penalize defense
counsel for requesting a lesser-related offense instruction at the close of the evidence.
The record shows that defense counsel innocently requested the instruction. Rejecting a
lesser-related offense instruction simply because defense counsel misunderstood the trial
judge's thinking constitutes an abuse of discretion. Moreover, neither the State nor the
trial court suffered any prejudice based on the mid-trial request. In sum, no reasonable
grounds supported denying the request.
Regardless of the legal nuances addressed in this appeal, both John and the State
agree that the trial judge had discretion whether to give the lesser-related offense
instruction. Appellant's Brief at 36; State's Brief at 13 (both citing State v. Evans , 668
P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983)). As discussed more fully in the opening brief, the record
indicates that defense counsel may have even filed a timely request before trial.
Appellant's Brief at 31-32. The State rejects this reading of the record and argues that
defense counsel's statements show that he did not request the instruction until the close
of the evidence. State's Brief at 13-15. The State ignores, however, the plausibility that
defense counsel simply forgot about requesting the instruction at the pretrial conference

5

that occurred several months prior to trial. Given an average public defender's heavy
case load and numerous clients, concluding that defense counsel did not remember his
actions at the pretrial conference is a reasonable assumption.
If, as the State maintains, defense counsel first requested the instruction during
trial, even viewing defense counsel's actions in the worst possible light merely shows
that he and the trial judge miscommunicated. Based on several years of experience in
criminal law and his practice in the Third Judicial District Court, defense counsel
honestly believed that the law allowed him to request a lesser included offense
instruction at the close of the evidence. R. 250B: 2. Defense counsel also had no time to
review jury instructions over the lunch recess because he had to teach a class. R. 249:
42-43. Moreover, the trial judge specifically ruled before lunch that he and counsel
would "have to spend some time on jury instructions at some point" later in the trial to
finalize the instructions. R. 249: 42.
These facts demonstrate that the trial judge and defense counsel simply
misunderstood each other over when to offer proposed instructions. This innocent
miscommunication does not justify depriving John of the right to instruct the jury on his
theory of the case. That right "serves a fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find
a defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts, rather than forcing it to elect between
the charges the prosecutor chooses to file and an acquittal." Hansen. 734 P.2d at 424.
The trial judge's approach to this right belies his duty to "liberally construe!"]" requests

6

for lesser-related offense instructions. Id.; see also State v. Carruth, 1999 UT 107, ^|6,
993 P.2d 869.
The trial judge further abused his discretion because giving the instruction could
have easily been accommodated. Although both the trial judge and the State complained
that the request caught them off-guard, neither of them identified any hardship in this
case. The trial judge complained that requests for a lesser-related offense instruction
present difficult questions for trial judges. R. 249: 95. Even assuming the accuracy of
this observation, the trial judge failed to explain why such decisions are more difficult
than any other evidentiary ruling judges render during the course of a trial. Further, in
this case, the trial judge had all of the information he needed to decide whether the law
required the instruction. No continuance was needed. In fact, as amended Rule of
Criminal Procedure 19 suggests, "the close of the evidence" is an ideal time to determine
whether the evidence supports a lesser-related offense instruction. Utah R. Crim. P.
19(b), (c) (2003). The trial judge's complaint had no application to this case
Likewise, the prosecutor complained that requesting the instruction at the end of
the evidence deprived the State of an opportunity to establish the value of the property
taken. To the contrary, Ms. Rodriguez testified to the date she purchased the stolen items
and their cost when she purchased them. R. 249: 17-18. Both items cost $200, while
one was a month old and the other was a year old. Id. This evidence belies the
prosecutor's complaints. Defense counsel's good-faith belief that he had timely
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requested the instruction coupled with the absence of any prejudice resulting from the
mid-trial request constituted an abuse of discretion.
The State's apparent concern for surprise is unfounded because the State should
be expected to prepare to prove the defendant's guilt on lesser offenses. Specifically,
because the State bears the burden of proving guilt, it is charged with the duty to be ready
to present evidence of guilt at trial. Baker, 671 P.2d at 157. Given this burden, the State
cannot seriously argue that requests for lesser-related offenses will result in '"trial by
ambush.'" State's Brief at 24-25 (quoting Jones v. State, 575 S.E.2d 456, 459 (Ga.
2003)).2 In the rare event that an unforeseen request for an lesser offense instruction
surprises the State, trial judges could re-open the prosecution's case at the close of the
evidence. See State v. Lawrence, 234 P.2d 600, 601 (Utah 1951) (prosecution can
request to re-open case).
Moreover, the trial judge acted capriciously in denying the requested instruction
when the judge himself may have misled defense counsel into any possible error. The
trial judge specifically stated that he would prepare the ,!propose[d]n instructions over the
lunch recess and then "at some point" the parties would "have a discussion" about the
instructions. R. 249: 42-43. The trial judge, thus, represented that the parties would
have an opportunity to discuss jury instructions later in the day. Defense counsel then

2

The State's constitutionally-assigned burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt also distinguishes this case from the discretion afforded the trial judge in the civil
cases. Schwartz v. Benzow, 2000 UT App 203 (memorandum decision).
8

relied on the representations that the trial judge had assumed responsibility for the
instructions himself and that further discussions on jury instructions would follow later.
To reject the defense's lesser-related offense instruction under these circumstances
amounts to an abuse of discretion.
The trial judge's actions distinguish this case from Evans. In that case, defense
counsel remained silent "knowing" that the trial judge was preparing final instructions.
Evans, 668 P.2d at 568. In contrast, here, the trial judge affirmatively represented that
further discussions with counsel would take place before the judge would finalize jury
instructions. In then denying the requested instruction, the trial judge deprived John of
the right to "permit[] the jury to find a defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts,
rather than forcing it to elect between the charges the prosecutor chooses to file and an
acquittal." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424. This arbitrary action results in a "miscarriage[] of
justice." Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d 1357, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Evans further has no application to this appeal because that case, unlike this
appeal, involved the failure to preserve arguments for appellate review. 668 P.2d at 568,
The State challenges this contention and argues that this Court should not consider the
merits of the motion for new trial because the trial judge's decision rested on waiver for
untimeliness and John "did nothing to cure his waiver under Evans.." State's Brief at 22
The state overlooks, however, that in addition to ruling on the timeliness of the request,
the trial judge addressed the merits of each of John's contentions both at trial and at the
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hearing during which he denied the motion for a new trial. R. 249: 91-97: 250B: 13-18.
This court has repeatedly ruled that "when a trial court considers the merits of an issue in
a motion for new trial, the issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Casey, 2001 UT App
205,1J6 n.2, 29 P.3d 25; see also State v. Seale. 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah), cert, denied
510 U.S. 865 (1993) (addressing merits of appeal because trial court did so in absence of
objection); State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 2 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (excusing failure to
object to supplemental jury instruction because trial court ruled on merits). Because
defense counsel preserved the merits of this case in the motion for new trial, this case is
distinguishable from Evans.
The State correctly notes that the amendments to Rule 19 took effect one month
after John's October 4, 2001, trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 19 (2002) (amended effective
November 1, 2001). Although the prior version of Rule 19 did not address the giving of
instructions during the course of a trial, it appears to have accommodated for such
practice. That version of the rule authorized trial judges to instruct the jury "[a]t the
close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs... ." Utah R.
Crim. P. 19(a) (2001) (emphasis added). As the amendments to Rule 19 demonstrate,
mid-trial instructions are not only desirable but may even be necessary, such as here, to
ensure a fair trial. As shown above, under any view of this case, the trial judge's refusal
to give the lesser-related instruction cannot be viewed as a "reasonable" or proper use of
discretion. Id
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD A DUTY TO CORRECTLY
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER OFFENSE

The State argues that this Court should uphold the trial judge's decision because
the proffered instruction on receiving stolen property "did not accurately define the
applicable law." State's Brief at 30. Even assuming that the instruction did not correctly
state the law, the trial judge had a duty to instruct the jury on receiving stolen property
because the evidence rationally supported that offense. Carruth, 1999 UT 107, ^|6, 993
P.2d 869. Trial judges have an affirmative "duty to instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the facts of the case." State v. Squire. 888 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). Trial judges are not relieved of this duty because a proffered instruction
incorrectly states the law. Rather, trial judges have a duty to correct the error and instruct
the jury on the applicable law. Id.
Ignoring the trial judges' duty to correctly instruct the jury, the State contends that
this Court has outright rejected jury instructions that "'incorrectly state[] the law.'"
State's Brief at 30 (quoting State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1J21, 52 P.3d 1210, cert, denied
123 S. Ct. 999 (2003)). Apparently, according to the State, if a criminal defendant offers
an incorrect instruction, the defendant forfeits the right to instruct the jury on the defense
theory of the case. State's Brief at 30-31. This argument misconstrues the law on
instructing juries.

Trial judges, not parties, are bound to adequately instruct the jury on

the law. Squire, 888 P.2d at 1104. If a reasonable basis appears in the evidence for a
lesser-related offense instruction, trial judges have a duty to correctly instruct the jury on
11

the defense theory. Carruth, 1999 UT 107, ^j6, 993 P.2d 869. The possibility that the
defense's proffered jury instruction erroneously defined the crime of receiving stolen
property meant that the trial judge should have drafted a correct instruction defining that
offense. See, e.g.. State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 179 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (trial judges
can "easily" amend criminal information to conform to jury instructions).

CONCLUSION
Because the trial judge erroneously refused to instruct the jury on a lesser related
offense, John requests this Court to reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial.
Dated this J3^ day of June, 2003.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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